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Abstract. In this paper we present a first attempt to represent social behavior of 
actors in a resource sharing context in such a way that different forms of 
solidarity can be detected and measured. We expect that constructing agent-
based models of water-related interactions at the interface of urban and rural 
areas, and running social simulations to study the occurrence and consequences 
of solidary behavior will produce insights that may eventually contribute to 
water and land resource management practice. We propose a typology for 
solidary behavior, present the agent-based architecture that we are using, show 
some illustrative results, and formulate some questions that will guide our 
future work.  
Keywords: agent-based model; social simulation; solidarity; typology; values. 
1   Introduction 
Is it conceivable that a farmer voluntarily gives up irrigation to improve the surface 
water quality in the city downstream? Or agrees to let his fields be inundated to 
reduce flood damage in urban areas? And will upstream city dwellers of their own 
accord invest in a separate system of rain water retention to avoid sewer overflows? 
Intrigued by these and other questions concerning water-dependent individuals who 
live at the interfaces between urban and rural areas, we have started to explore the 
issue of solidarity around water sharing and maintenance of water resources during an 
interdisciplinary workshop in January 2007 in Montpellier1. The participating 
researchers brought a variety of case studies in very different geographical and 
political contexts to the table, and a variety of definitions of solidarity as well. 
To sort out this diversity of situations of water-related interactions in which some 
form of solidarity becomes apparent or is called for, we decided to develop a 
decontextualised simulation model of solidarity with agents seeking to uphold various 
                                                          
1 This workshop benefited from the participation of Géraldine Abrami, Olivier Barreteau, 
Bettina Blümling Pieter Bots, Catherine Carré, Flavie Cernesson, Raphaële Ducrot, Katrin 
Erdlenbruch, Patrice Garin, Patrick Le Goulven, and Cathy Werey. We wish to thank them 
for numerous contributions to the discussion, some of which provided inspiration for this 
paper. However, only the authors are responsible for the views and ideas put forward in this 
paper. 
values, living in either an urban area or a rural area, and sharing a resource. The 
purpose of these models is to allow analysis how different types of solidarity (can) 
play a role in the dynamics of a system that comprises an urban area and a rural area 
linked by a shared resource. This analysis is expected to provide useful feedback to 
the initial interdisciplinary group, allowing the researchers to focus on common 
questions regarding solidarity about water, questions that need to be answered not 
only to improve water resource management, but also to strengthen the social 
cohesion of territories. 
This paper presents the first stage of this work: a sketch of an urban perspective 
and a rural perspective on the role and use of land and water resources, a 
categorization of different types of solidarity, the So-Si-So modeling platform that we 
are developing to represent and analyze behavioral patterns of solidarity, and an 
embryonic version of Solid’Eau, a simulation model that eventually should allow us 
to study the social behavior of agents located in a system around a shared water 
resource. The first results obtained with this model show that the So-Si-So model 
architecture indeed allows identifying and measuring different types of solidarity, and 
lead to several questions that will guide our future work in this area.  
2   Solidarity at the Interface between Urban and Rural Areas 
The social phenomena that we are interested in spring from the tension between two 
opposing perspectives on water issues: an urban perspective and a rural perspective. 
At a first glance, this tension leads to attempts from one group to impose constraints 
on, or get compensations from, the other group. Looking more closely, a variety of 
more specific and refined stakeholder perceptions can be distinguished within each 
perspective. Moreover, at the level of individuals, the boundary between an urban 
community and a rural community is not so clear as it is sometimes claimed: there is 
always a peri-urban area where individuals are difficult to categorize as urban or 
rural, individuals migrate at various speeds from urban areas to rural areas and vice 
versa, and they are linked to both types of areas in intricate ways. To emphasize 
interdependency and the potential for conflict, however, the two perspectives are 
characterized as follows: 
  
Urban perspective: 
• Cities are the centers of modern human society. Their complex social structure is 
essential for technological, economic and cultural development. 
• Water is a necessity of life. Citizens are entitled to adequate drinking water supply 
and sanitation. 
• Rural areas are indispensable for food production, but large scale agriculture 
reduces the ecological and recreational value of the landscape. 
• Rivers are a drinking water supply as well as a discharge channel for rainwater and 
wastewater, but also a potential threat that needs to be contained by adequate flood 
prevention measures. 
• The natural water system has a high capacity for regeneration, but balances are 
threatened by the extraction of irrigation water and heavy use of fertilizers and 
pesticides in agricultural production. 
 
Rural perspective: 
• Not only historically, but also today, the modern, human society has its roots in 
small agricultural communities. Without agriculture no food, and without food no 
cities. 
• Water supports natural vegetation and wildlife as well as agriculture and human 
life. The traditional rural life style is in harmony with nature and uses water 
resources in a sustainable way. 
• The growth in population, which is strongest in urban areas, puts greater demands 
on agricultural production as well as on facilities for recreation.  
• Urbanization creates a new hydrological environment (buildings and roads replace 
vegetation and soil, sewers replace stream channels), reducing infiltration and 
groundwater recharge while increasing runoff and the probability of flooding.  
• Urban areas produce high volumes of faeces and other organic waste, heavy 
metals, and mineral oil products. Although sewage systems and wastewater 
treatment plants mitigate emission to surface water, high peak discharges generate 
sewer overflows. Also, industrial and household consumption of electricity causes 
thermal pollution that threatens aquatic wildlife. 
 
These outlines of the urban and rural perspectives clearly show a number of 
interdependencies and tensions that underlie many water resource management issues. 
However, these interdependencies and tensions may not be obvious at the stakeholder 
level. Any attempt to cope with undesirable impacts from one perspective is likely to 
generate unexpected feedbacks on other aspects of the other perspective. For example, 
if an urban group succeeds in imposing constraints on rural water use for agriculture, 
this will impact on landscapes which are valuable for residents of urban areas.  
Given these more or less straightforward physical interdependencies, we want to 
question whether any social link between both parties exists or can be created or 
reinforced that could manage these physical interdependencies. Institutions in the 
sense of Ostrom (1990) may exist that already provide or could establish this social 
link. But what we are presently even more interested in are loose forms of interaction 
such as solidarity. 
Our work is based in the assumption that raising awareness of physical 
interdependencies and social links is a way towards a management of the resource 
better for the whole system. In this perspective, we think that models are effective 
tools to reveal and make explicit those situations where the heterogeneity within each 
group, and the existing relations at the individual level between persons associated 
with one group or the other is providing opportunities (1) to find institutions to 
manage the interdependencies, and (2) to find synergies among various perspectives. 
Meanwhile, we see our modeling work also as a means to achieve a better 
formalization of solidarity situations and of the solidarity concept itself. This paper 
reports our progress in this formalization to date.  
 3   Categories of Solidarity 
The capacity to resolve the tensions as water resources become scarce is largely 
determined by the willingness of stakeholders to share. It is at this point that the 
concept of solidarity becomes interesting. Solidarity is a loose form of social binding 
characterized by latent reciprocity: the interdependencies need not be explicitly 
known or understood by those involved. Solidarity is a feeling, rather than a 
calculated attitude. 
On the individual level, solidarity can be defined as “a sense of community 
between persons who, despite their differences, believe to have the same objective(s) 
that one has achieved more than the other, from which rises the voluntary obligation 
to support the other, coupled with the entitlement to support from the other should the 
situation be reversed” (Hondrich & Koch-Arzberger 1992, p. 14-15). Segall (2005) 
sees solidarity as a relation between the individual and the collective: “[Social 
solidarity] comprises the following phenomena: 
• Integration – Identification on the part of the individual with the goals and features 
of the collective (Miller, 1999, p. 26); 
• Commitment to the common good – Willingness to forgo self-interest for the sake 
of the common good (Mason, 1998); 
• Empathy – concern for the wellbeing of other members who are less well off than 
oneself (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 472; Mason, 1998); 
• Trust – the willingness to suspend suspicion of others, at least until receipt of 
evidence to the contrary (Misztal, 1996, p. 209; Seligman, 1997, p. 94; Warren, 
1999, p. 330).” (Segall 2005, p. 362, the references are his). 
 
Thus, solidarity may be a relation between two individuals or a relation between an 
individual and the collective that the individual is part of. When considering the 
(potential) solidarity between urban and rural areas, both relations need to be 
examined. 
In this paper, we focus on solidarity at the individual level, where solidarity 
involves a voluntary action of person A in support of another person B where A by 
performing this action knowingly incurs a cost to himself. The definition by Hondrich 
and Koch-Arzberger is quite precise with regard to the mechanism that leads to 
solidary action: The sense of community that leads A to support B stems from A’s 
belief that A and B share certain values and objectives. When A furthermore believes 
to have achieved these objectives more than B, A experiences a voluntary obligation 
to support B, coupled with the implicit entitlement to support from B should the 
situation be reversed. This precision allows us to distinguish the following categories 
of solidary behavior:  
• The action of A is an act of altruism, rather than one of solidarity, when it is 
motivated solely by the belief that this action will contribute to the realization of 
B’s objectives (absence of the shared objectives aspect). Example: A is wealthy 
and donates, for no particular reason other than to do good, to a charity 
organization that funds B to recover from flood damage. 
• The action of A is an act of ‘heartfelt solidarity’ when it is motivated by the sense 
of community due to A’s belief that B shares some of his own objectives. Example: 
Village A does not lie in a flood-prone area and its inhabitants nonetheless 
contribute to a flood damage compensation fund for village B because they believe 
that those who live in village B aim, just like they do, to preserve their 
characteristic houses as part of their cultural heritage. 
• The action of A is and act of ‘opportune solidarity’ when A and B have the same 
objective and A values this objective even more than B (dominance of self-
interest). Example: Some inhabitants of A contribute to the flood damage 
compensation fund for village B because they value its cultural heritage even more 
than the inhabitants of B. 
• An action of A is an act of ‘calculated solidarity’ when A takes this action 
motivated by his expectation of possible future benefits should he find himself in a 
situation similar to B (absence of the latent reciprocity aspect). Example: Village A 
and B are both situated in a flood-prone area and their inhabitants choose to 
contribute to the flood damage compensation fund because that will cover their 
own flood risk. 
• The action of A is an act of ‘self-interested solidarity’ when A’s actual motivation 
to support B does not stem from B’s objectives, but from A’s own, different 
objectives. Example: Village A does not lie in a flood-prone area and yet some of 
its inhabitants contribute to the flood damage compensation fund for village B, but 
they do so merely to increase the fidelity of their customers living in the flood-
prone village B. 
• An action of A is an act of ‘imposed solidarity’ when A takes this action as a result 
of some contract or social rule (absence of the voluntary aspect of the action). 
Example: The people in villages A an B all pay a national income-based tax, the 
revenues of which are used to compensate people who incur flood damage. 
 
These definitions of solidarity provide categories for individual behavioral 
patterns. In the present stage of our research, we focus on these patterns to study the 
conditions that lead to different forms of solidarity, and the effect on a group level. In 
a later stage, we will also consider group solidarity, that is, the degree to which 
individuals in a group comply with corporate rules in the absence of compensation 
(Hechter, 1987, p. 39). 
4   So-Si-So: A modelling Platform to Analyse Solidarity in 
Behavioural Patterns 
In this section we describe the modelling platform called So-Si-So (Social Simulation 
of Solidarity) that we have developed to study the simulated behaviour of cognitive 
agents, situated in physical spaces, and interacting in social spaces.  
To be able to distinguish between the different types of solidarity defined in the 
previous section, the observer must have access to the mental state (beliefs, 
motivations) of both A and B. Our agent-based models should therefore allow 
inspection of the motives for agents to take action. The design of So-Si-So agents 
should otherwise be as simple as possible. This led us to the following choices: 
• Agents derive their ultimate motivation for action from values, which they seek to 
uphold. Some values are intrinsically individualistic (e.g., one’s own survival), 
other values are intrinsically collective (e.g., peace). 
• Agents have concerns that define relations between their values and indicators that 
give them insights on aspects of the physical spaces and/or the social spaces that 
they have access to. 
• Agents acquire factual beliefs about these indicators through their sensors. Being 
actor-bound, sensors are subjective: different agents may construct different factual 
beliefs about the same situation. 
• Agents become privately concerned when, according to their factual beliefs, one or 
more of these aspects appear to be in bad shape. 
• Agents may also become socially concerned, that is, consider the concerns of other 
agents situated in their social space(s). Agents will become socially concerned only 
if they have some inclination towards altruism.  
• To address concerns (their own and/or those of other agents), agents evaluate their 
causal beliefs, looking for actions that they expect to ameliorate the aspects of their 
environment about which they are concerned. 
• For each of their ‘active’ concerns, agents choose the action (insofar available) that 
seems best to them.  
 
This agent design permits the modeller to trace for each action taken the values that 
motivated the agent to perform this action, and therefore also to detect solidary 
actions (actions that address the concerns of others) and distinguish between different 
types of solidarity. To demonstrate this, we must define more precisely the way in 
which So-Si-So agents come to act: 
• An agent is represented as an 12-tuple a = (Val, Con, Sen, Bfact, m, α, Cp, Cs, 
Cw, Bcaus, budget, Soc) where Val is a set of values, Con a set of potential 
concerns, Sen a set of sensors, Bfact the set of factual beliefs, m the agent’s 
memory depth (represented as a non-negative integer value), α the agent’s 
inclination towards altruism (represented on the interval [0, 1]), Cp, Cs and Cw 
sets of, respectively, private, social, and weighted concerns, Bcaus a set causal 
beliefs, budget the agent’s financial resources (represented as a non-negative real 
value), and Soc the set of social spaces that a is part of. 
• A value is represented as a 3-tuple (idea, type, importance), where idea 
expresses something that the agent holds dear, for example: ‘survival’, ‘wealth’ or 
‘environment’. The value type is either IND (for individualistic) or COL (for 
collective). When an agent has multiple values, their relative importance can be 
represented on the interval of (0, 1].  
• A potential concern is represented as a 3-tuple (indicator, value, intensity) 
that expresses the subjective relation that the agent sees between some aspect of 
the world and what the agent holds dear. When an agent considers multiple 
indicators to be related to the same value (for example, both quality and quantity of 
the water resource relate to the value ‘ecology’), the relative intensity of their 
relations with this value can be represented on the (0, 1] interval. 
• A factual belief is represented as a 3-tuple (tick, indicator, judgement) that 
expresses how the agent perceives some aspect of its environment at a particular 
tick (time step as counted by the model’s clock) in the simulation. An agent’s 
factual belief list cannot contain beliefs older than the agent’s memory depth. New 
factual beliefs are added to the agent’s factual belief list by the agent’s sensors, 
where a sensor typically compares one or several variables in the agent’s 
environment with pre-defined threshold values, and produces a judgement on some 
scale. In our experiments, we used this scale: AWFUL=-1, BAD=-0.5, 
NEUTRAL=0, GOOD=+0.5, GREAT=+1, but other scales can be defined, as 
long as they map onto the same interval of [-1, 1]. 
• The three lists of actual concerns (private, social, and weighted, respectively) 
contain 2-tuples (concern, state) that express for the current time step the 
degree (represented by the numeric field state) to which the agent is actually 
concerned about certain aspects. For example, when in time step 25 an agent has a 
factual belief (25, ‘water quantity’, BAD), and the potential concern c = 
(‘water quantity’, ‘ecology’, 1), its private concern will be pc = (c, -0.5). 
Private concerns are created from the agent’s own potential concerns, social 
concerns are created from other agents’ potential concerns. The set of weighted 
concerns contains the weighted average of an agent’s private and social concerns. 
It is this set of actual concerns that the agent used for taking decisions.  
• A causal belief is a 3-tuple (action, effects, cost) that expresses the relation that 
the agent sees between an action, its effects on one or more indicators, and the 
costs involved. For example, the causal belief (‘SELF:produce’, {(‘water 
quality’, BAD), (‘income’, GOOD)}, 50) represents that the agent believes 
that its own action ‘produce’ affects two indicators and will require 50 of the 
agent’s budget units. The list of causal beliefs may be incomplete (thus 
representing what an agent conceives as possible) and even incorrect (agents may 
wrongly estimate effectiveness and/or cost). Agents may also have causal beliefs 
about actions that can be taken by other agents. 
• An action represents what agents can do. The actual consequences of actions are 
calculated by the physical space entities and/or social space entities that the agent 
has access to. 
 
Physical spaces, social spaces and their autonomous evolution (i.e., state changes 
that are not the immediate result of actions of agents) are defined by the modeller (see 
the example in section 5). Once physical spaces, social spaces and agents have been 
initialised, a So-Si-So model iterates through this cycle: 
1. The agents get the opportunity to act. In the experiments reported in this paper, this 
happens in a fixed sequence: the order in which the agents were created. 
2. The social spaces coordinate collective actions. Collective actions are actions that 
require more than one agent to be effective, so agents can only ‘announce’ their 
intention to perform such an action in a social space. When all agents have had the 
opportunity to act, each social space checks whether the conditions for successful 
collective action as specified by the modeller (e.g., at least five agents are needed 
for this action to be effective) are met, and only if that is the case will the 
consequences of the action be effectuated as changes in the state of certain physical 
and/or social spaces.  In the experiments reported in this paper, this feature has not 
been used. 
3. The physical spaces evolve. Although the immediate consequences of agent actions 
have all been effectuated, the state of the physical spaces may still change 
autonomously. 
4. The agents evolve. Similar to physical spaces, certain attributes of agents may also 
change as a function of time, independently of agent actions. 
5. The model advances to the next time step: Clock.tick = Clock.tick + 1 
 
A So-Si-So agent a comes to act by in a sequence of steps: 
 
1. Forget. Agent a removes all factual beliefs fb from a.Bfact for which 
(Clock.tick – fb.tick) > a.m. 
2. Perceive. Agent a activates each of its sensors; each sensor in a.Sens may add to 
a.Bfact a new factual belief about the state of a’s environment. 
3. Appraise. Agent a checks to see whether its factual beliefs activate one or more of 
its potential concerns: for each factual belief fb in a.Bfact the agent checks 
whether it has a potential concern c in a.Con with c.indicator = fb.indicator; if 
that is the case, the agent checks to see whether it already has a private concern pc 
with pc.concern = c; if not, such a private concern pc is created (with pc.state 
initialised to 0) and added to the agent’s set of private concerns; the state of the 
(new) private concern pc is then updated as follows: 
     pc.state = pc.state + c.intensity*c.value.importance*fb.judgement 
4. Survey socially. The agent a considers the concerns of those agents with which it 
has a social relation: let n be the sum, for each social space ss in a.Soc, of the 
number of other agents that are also part of ss; then for each social space ss in 
a.Soc, the agent a checks for each other agent b in ss whether it has one or more 
weighted concerns wc in b.Cw with wc.state < 0 and wc.concern.value.type 
= COL. For each such wc, agent a checks to see whether it already has a social 
concern sc with sc.concern = wc.concern; if not, such a social concern sc is 
created (with sc.state initialised to 0) and added to a.Soc; the state of agent a’s 
(new) social concern sc is then updated as follows: 
      a.sc.state = a.sc.state + b.wc.state / n 
The division by n makes that the scale for the state attributes of the agent’s 
private concerns and its social concerns is the same. Note, however, that if some 
other agent is part of more than one of the agent’s social spaces, its concerns will 
be considered several times. We see this as appropriate, as it reflects that in reality 
those other agents with multiple relations will also have more influence on the 
agent. 
5. Weigh up private and social concerns. Agent a’s parameter α is used when the 
agent merges its private and social concerns into its set of weighted concerns Cw: 
starting with an empty set, the agent first adds for each of its private concerns pc a 
new weighted concern wc with wc.state = pc.state*(1-α); then for each of its 
social concerns sc, the agent checks to see whether it already has a weighted 
concern wc with wc.concern = sc.concern; if not, a new weighted concern wc is 
added with wc.state initialised to sc.state*α; otherwise, the state of the existing 
weighted concern wc is  updated as follows: 
      wc.state = wc.state + sc.state*α 
6. Deliberate. For each of its weighted concerns wc (in order of increasing state, so 
as to deal with the worst problem first) agent a checks its causal beliefs looking for 
actions that are believed to alleviate this concern. More precisely: the agent selects 
those causal beliefs b with b.effects containing a 2-tuple e = (indicator, 
impact) with e.indicator = wc.concern.indicator and e.impact > 0 (i.e., 
GOOD or GREAT). Agent a then selects the action that is still affordable (b.cost 
≤ a.budget) and has the highest utility (taking into account its consequences for 
its other concerns), adds it to its action list, and computes its remaining budget. 
The utility u of an action is calculated as follows: starting with an initial value u = 
0, the agent checks for each of the action’s effects e = (indicator, impact) 
whether it has one or more weighted concerns wc with wc.indicator = 
e.indicator and wc.state < 0, and for each such concern  u = u – 
e.impact*wc.state. This reflects that a only considers the indicators a is 
concerned about (ignoring all other indicators), and will favour those with a 
(strong) positive effect on indicators whose state is (very) negative. 
7. Act: the agent performs the actions on its action list. Note that the actual 
consequences of each action for the agent’s own attributes (notably a.budget) as 
defined by the modeller may differ form the anticipated consequences, that is, the 
effects according to the agent’s causal beliefs. 
 
This architecture makes it possible to detect different types of solidarity because it 
allows scrutinizing an agent’s motivation for taking certain actions.  
The basic characteristic of an act of solidarity action is that agent a takes this 
action to support agent b, and that a makes some kind of sacrifice by doing so. In the 
So-Si-So architecture, agents are aware of the concerns of other agents, but on an 
aggregate level only. Where a’s private concerns a.Cp are its own and therefore 
individual, a’s social concerns a.Cs are a ‘weighted union’ of the weighted concerns 
of a set of other agents. Thus, the ‘other agent’ b in our definitions of solidarity is the 
aggregate of all agents in a’s social spaces, rather than an individual agent. 
The terms ‘support’ and ‘sacrifice’ both entail a concept of utility: an action of a 
supports b when it produces positive utility for b, and it constitutes a sacrifice for a if 
it produces negative utility for a. By the same type of reasoning, a supports b by not 
taking an action that would produce negative utility for b, even though it would 
produce positive utility for a. The foregone utility for a then constitutes a’s sacrifice. 
While deliberating, agent a constructs an action list, selecting (insofar as a’s 
budget permits) for each of its weighted concerns a.Cw the action with the highest 
utility. To see whether a makes a sacrifice, a second action list is constructed 
according to the same procedure but now based on a’s private concerns a.Cp. The 
former (from now on called the ‘weighted action list’ of a) represents what a does, the 
latter (a’s ‘private action list’) represents what a would have done if b had not existed. 
Likewise, a’s ‘social action list’ is constructed on the basis of a’s social concerns 
a.Cs.  
Using these three action lists, we can now define the following types of utility: 
• Being based on a’s weighted concerns, the utility of an action x on a’s weighted 
action list is called the ‘weighted utility’ of action x. The ‘private utility’ and the 
‘social utility’ of x are defined likewise. 
• Usoc cumulates the social utility of actions in a’s weighted action list that are not 
in a’s private action list PLUS for those actions x that are in both lists the ‘social 
utility surplus’ defined as the difference (if positive) of social utility of x – private 
utility of x. 
• Uneg cumulates the negative private utility of actions in a’s weighted action list. 
Having a negative private utility, such actions will not be in a’s private action list. 
• Uasoc cumulates the negative social utility for actions in a’s weighted action list. 
When an action x has a social utility < 0 and yet occurs in the weighted action list, 
it must be motivated by private concerns only, hence Uasoc, which stands for 
‘anti-social utility’. 
• Uopp cumulates for actions in a’s weighted action list that are also in a’s private 
action list (but only those driven by the same concern, with the state of a’s private 
concern being worse than the state of a’s social concern) the ‘private utility 
surplus’ defined as the difference (if positive) of private utility of x – social utility 
of x. 
• Uself cumulates the private utility surplus for the remaining (i.e., not used for 
Uopp) actions in a’s weighted action list that are also in a’s private action list. 
• Uforegone cumulates the private utility of actions in a’s private action list that are 
not in a’s weighted action list. Motivated by social concerns, a decided not to take 
these actions, hence the term ‘forgone utility’. 
 
As shown in Table 1, these different types of utility allow us to detect and measure 
four of the six types identified in section 3. 
Table 1. Operationalisation of different types of solidarity 
Type of solidarity Detection/measure 
altruism 
heartfelt solidarity 
Usoc + Uneg + Uforegone 
The distinction between altruism and heartfelt solidarity can be 
made in step 4 (survey socially). Altruistic actions are precluded 
by making agent a consider only those social concerns that are 
related to a value that also occurs in a.Val. As the present 
Solid’eau model includes only one collective value, the 
difference cannot occur. 
opportune solidarity Uopp 
self-interested solidarity Uself 
calculated solidarity Not represented in So-Si-So models, as in the present 
architecture agents cannot anticipate on other agent’s actions 
and therefore not foresee reciprocity.   
imposed solidarity Not represented in So-Si-So models, as presently agents are 
driven only by their own values. This will change once we have 
extended the architecture with social norms. 
 
In view of the categories of solidarity we want to test, we did not need to make 
agents foresighted with respect to expected social behavioural patterns. Agents are 
myopic and act only upon their knowledge of consequences of potential actions they 
might perform on their own concerns or on concerns of others. They do not take into 
account any belief or expectation regarding others’ actions like in Conte and Paolucci 
(2002) or in Dittrich et al. (2003). As noted in Table 1, such sophistication will be 
needed to detect calculated solidarity. 
Agents in So-Si-So compute their perceptions according to their values only, their 
concerns according to their actual perceptions (and some of their previous 
perceptions, since agents can keep their factual beliefs for memory depth time steps), 
and their actions according to their causal beliefs based on actions. Figure 1 below is 
expanding the Perception-Deliberation-Action cycle from Jacques Ferber (1999) as it 
is activated in So-Si-So agents. If more cognitive agents are required, the deliberation 
stage might be more refined, for example through the identification and choice of 
actions, taking into account more than causal beliefs only. 
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Fig. 1. Extension of Ferber's Perception-Deliberation-Action cycle in So-Si-So 
5   A simple Test Model 
We tested So-Si-So with what we see as an embryonic version of Solid’eau: a simple 
decontextualised model of a set of individuals, equipped with the previously 
described cognitive capacities, located in an urban or a rural area, in which they have 
a productive activity using units of a shared resource.  To facilitate analysis, we use 
no stochastic parameters. The two areas (modelled as physical spaces) are linked by a 
water resource. This resource is localized, with a flow from an upstream space to a 
downstream one, depending on resource availability in the upstream space. As it is the 
most frequent case, we assume that the rural physical space is located upstream. The 
connection between the two spaces is described by the two following rules: 
• a constant ratio of resource level, φ, disappears from upstream space and flows in 
downstream space, 
• if the resource availability in the upstream space after resource renewal exceeds its 
maximum capacity, the surplus flows to the downstream part. 
 
The resource in the upstream physical space renews at a fixed rate ρ relative to its 
maximum capacity. 
Agents are localised in either one of the physical spaces. The population is then 
described by the total number, N, and the ratio in urban area, θ. Urban agents and a 
part of rural agents (those who have social ties in the urban area) share a social space.  
Agents are described by their localisation, the weight α they attach to social 
concerns, and their thresholds to determine how they assess the information received 
from their sensors. All agents are driven by three values: (‘survival’, IND, 1), 
(‘environment’, COL, 0.33) and (‘wealth’, IND, 0.33), the numbers indicating 
relative importance, with potential concerns (‘subsistence’, ‘survival’, 1), 
(‘budget’, ‘wealth’, 1) and (‘resource’, ‘environment’, 1). 
Possible actions of agents are production at level 0, 1, 2, or 3, where production at 
level 0 means: do not produce. Production in a rural area consumes πr*level units of 
resource and generates Υr*level units of budget, respectively πu*level and Υu*level 
in urban areas. Agents also incur production costs of γ*level, the base production cost 
γ being equal for urban and rural areas. 
All agents have the same causal beliefs: 
• (‘produce.0’, {(‘subsistence’, AWFUL), (‘resource’, GOOD)}, 0) 
• (‘produce.1’, {(‘subsistence’, GOOD), (‘budget’, GOOD)}, γ) 
• (‘produce.2’, {(‘subsistence’,GREAT), (‘budget’,GOOD), (‘resource’,BAD)}, 2*γ) 
• (‘produce.3’, {(‘subsistence’,GREAT), (‘budget’,GREAT), (‘resource’,AWFUL)}, 3*γ) 
At each tick, all agents spend the same fixed amount of budget for their cost of 
living, λ. 
Table 2. Parameter setting of the Solid’eau model 
Parameter Value 
φ, flow rate 0.2 
ρ, resource renewal per tick 0.2 
SmaxR, maximum resource level in rural area 100 
SmaxU, maximum resource level in urban area 100 
N, total population 30 
θ, fraction of urban population 0.7 
πr, production factor in rural area 3 
πu, production factor in urban area 2 
Υr, production yield in rural area 200 
Υu, production yield in urban area 250 
λ, cost of living 50 
α, altruism 0.4 
β, initial value of agent budget 250 
γ, base production cost 50 
SB, budget threshold below which sensor yields (‘subsistence’, BAD) 250 
SA, budget threshold below which sensor yields (‘survival’, AWFUL) 175 
BB, budget growth threshold below which sensor yields (‘budget’, BAD) 0.2 
BA, budget growth threshold below which sensor yields (‘budget’, AWFUL) 0.1 
RB, resource threshold below which sensor yields (‘resource’, BAD) 60 
RA, resource threshold below which sensor yields (‘resource’, AWFUL) 42 
The order in which agents can act (and therefore co-determines their actual 
resource use, given a chosen production level) is fixed for each physical space. All 
agents have sensors that generate factual beliefs fb = (indicator, judgement) for 
the indicators ‘resource’ (to assess the resource availability in the physical area where 
the agent produces), ‘subsistence’ (to assess whether the agent’s budget is sufficient 
to cover its cost of living), and ‘budget’ (to assess whether the agent’s budget is on 
average increasing, with a desired percentage per year. These sensors return 
judgements based on threshold values. In the model we have used so far, all agents to 
have the same thresholds for the same concern, but these threshold values may be 
individualised. Table 2 shows the threshold values used, as well as all other parameter 
values for the model used in the simulations referred to in the next section. 
6   Simulation Results 
Even though this work is still ongoing, we have been able to verify that the So-Si-So 
model architecture permits identification and measurement of the various categories 
and subcategories of solidarity, even with a model with but few options in terms of 
values and the structure of social spaces. The model’s outcomes have been verified 
through code proofreading and comparison of outcomes with expectations. 
Figure 2 and 3 show two scenarios, the only difference being that in the second 
scenario some of the rural agents do not share the urban-rural social space. As the aim 
of this paper is to propose a categorisation for solidary behaviour and ways to 
measure it, the model results are illustrations that hold little surprises. In both 
scenarios, stimulated by their desire for wealth (a budget increase of at least 10% and 
preferably 20% or more of their initial budget each time step), the agents who can use 
the resource first produce at high levels, while those who then see the resource 
dwindle become concerned about it and produce less. Around tick 30, the least 
fortunate agents start to produce merely to survive (this causes the high peaks of self-
interested utility: production serves both survival and wealth). As more agents 
become very concerned about the resource, agents who share their social space start 
foregoing high production (this causes the peaks of foregone utility that first appear 
around tick 40) and by consequence fall back in wealth. Looking at both the resource 
level plot and the budget units graph in Fig. 2, it can be seen that gradually more rural 
agents forego production even when their resource (upstream) would permit it. 
As was expected, the first scenario shows more solidary behaviour. In the second 
scenario, a resource crisis occurs between tick 110 and 125, when more than half of 
the urban agents run out of budget. In the model used, this makes them become 
inactive, which represents that the inhabitants leave the region, or—worse—starve. 
Inactive agents are ignored, so their concerns no longer influence the deliberation of 
other agents. As a result, the three rural agents who were sensitive to the urban 
agents’ concerns feel less need for solidarity pick up their production.  
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Fig 2. Scenario in which all agents are part of one and the same social space 
The steady alternation in Fig. 3 between production at level 0 and level 1 shown by 
the six rural agents without a social space reflects their own concern with the resource 
only; they are the last to access the rural resource, and their budget drops only when 
the three rural agents who do share a social space with the other agents pick up their 
production. 
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Fig 3. Same scenario, except that 6 of 9 rural agents have no social ties with the other agents  
6   Conclusion and perspectives 
With this tentative framework to represent solidarity at an individual level we have 
succeeded in identifying and distinguishing solidary actions in a simple virtual world, 
and we have paved the way for an evolution towards a more grounded representation 
of resources and networks of relations between agents (via social spaces) as well as 
between agents and these resources (via physical spaces).  
To achieve this evolution we need to couple this framework with a more structured 
description of the virtual world, and to include concepts that will permit 
representation and analysis of other forms of solidarity. For example, to represent 
imposed solidarity, we will have to include norms. 
We aim at incorporating this work in a policy perspective, through the 
identification of existing social networks which might serve as driving belt for 
solidarity actions and joint preservation of resources across physical spaces. 
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